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Abstract: Water markets have been used by Australian irrigators as a way to reduce risk and 
uncertainty in times of low water allocations and rainfall. However, little is known about 
how irrigators’ bidding trading behavior in water markets compares to other markets, nor is 
it known what role uncertainty and a lack of water in a variable and changing climate plays 
in influencing behavior. This paper studies irrigator behavior in Victorian water markets over 
a decade (a time period that included a severe drought). In particular, it studies the evidence 
for price clustering (when water bids/offers end mostly around particular numbers),  
a common phenomenon present in other established markets. We found that clustering in 
bid/offer prices in Victorian water allocation markets was influenced by uncertainty and 
strategic behavior. Water traders evaluate the costs and benefits of clustering and act 
according to their risk aversion levels. Water market buyer clustering behavior was mostly 
explained by increased market uncertainty (in particular, hotter and drier conditions), while 
seller-clustering behavior is mostly explained by strategic behavioral factors which evaluate 
the costs and benefits of clustering. 
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1. Introduction 
Water scarcity has emerged in many semi-arid regions of the world. This requires the development 
of mechanisms to efficiently reallocate available resources between competing extractive as well as  
in-stream uses. Water markets have been promoted as an efficient way of facilitating this process in a 
number of jurisdictions, such as Australia, USA and Chile [1–3] and more recently in Canada [4] and 
Spain [5]. As scarcity intensifies, demand for, and participation in, water markets is likely to increase. 
A continual review of market mechanisms will help to improve and facilitate greater market efficiency, 
through reducing transaction costs, improving product choice or reducing barriers to trade. Adoption of 
water market trading (where available) will represent one potential adaptation strategy for many 
irrigators in the face of climate change. Modeling by Adamson, Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin [6] 
demonstrates that adaptation will partially offset the adverse impact of climate change and suggests that 
improvements in the function of water markets could support adaptation. 
In order to provide greater insights into how to best improve water market mechanisms and water 
management in general, a better understanding of irrigators’ behavior in such markets and how this 
compares to behavior in other financial markets is necessary. In the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) of 
Australia, irrigators’ participation in the water market has been growing over the past two decades and 
this provides a unique opportunity to study irrigators’ water market behavior. Two major forms of water 
markets exist in the MDB: the water allocation market (also known as temporary water markets,  
which involve the short-term right to use of water) and the water entitlement market (also known as 
permanent water markets involving the long-term right to access water—see Wheeler et al. [7] for more 
detail). This paper focuses on the water allocation market. 
Since the Council of Australian Governments water reform agenda in 1994, water markets have 
played a central role in allowing farmers to deal with increased volatility, risk and adjustment pressures 
by permitting them to alter their short and long-term access to water resources as well as allowing them 
to exit out of irrigation while realizing their water assets [8,9]. In 2011, the Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority (MDBA) released the MDB Plan, with a target of 2750 GL to be returned from consumptive 
to environmental use [10]. Water entitlements are to be sourced from willing sellers, and are bought  
by the Commonwealth of Australia. Increasingly, there are arguments that governments should also 
consider buying water from the allocation market (otherwise known as temporary water available in one 
season) to provide environmental flows [11]. The rationale for government utilizing the water allocation 
market is that benefits of carry-over, lower water allocation prices, and temporal demand can provide a 
more efficient and flexible supply of water to meet stochastic environmental flow requirements since the 
timing of entitlement releases does not correspond well with the volume and timing of water applications 
required to achieve environmental objectives [3,12]. 
In light of these policy arguments regarding government intervention in the allocation market, a more 
thorough understanding of irrigators’ trading behavior in that market, particularly how they bid and offer 
for water, is needed. In particular, we need to understand how variability in climate conditions impacts 
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on water market trading behavior. One way of analyzing water market trader behavior is to analyze the 
extent to which irrigator bids or offers exhibit price clustering (that is, the extent they cluster around 
particular numbers). The existence of clustering is important as it identifies a possible dead-weight loss 
that exists in water allocation markets. Utilizing bid and offer data also allows us to understand how 
differently buyers and sellers act in the water market, something that is difficult to do in other water 
market analysis. It also offers continuing insights into how irrigators behave in water markets, and how 
similar (or dissimilar) their behavior is to participation in financial markets. Understanding the similarity 
between irrigator bidding and offering behavior in a water market and a trader in a stock market may 
also offer insights into how well introducing other water market products (for example: option trading) 
will be received. For instance, Heaney et al. [13] discuss how missing options markets in storage  
and delivery might impact water trading. Addressing these issues is a function of market design.  
Hence, undertaking analysis on price clustering is informative for water management policies aiming to 
improve the efficiency and flexibility of resource allocation. 
Price clustering in financial markets has been well documented in the literature (e.g., Chung and 
Chiang [14]). Clustering is found when indicative quotes for currencies end mostly around particular 
numbers, for example, those with either “zero” or “five”. Round numbers are disproportionately 
represented in bid-ask spreads for major currencies. Typically, the economics and psychological 
literature identify different reasons for clustering. In economics, clustering is considered a rational 
response to trading impediments. In psychology, clustering is thought to occur due to a human bias for 
prominent numbers, such as zero and one. There have been very few studies that have analyzed 
clustering in other non-financial product markets. There are a number of similarities between financial 
markets and water markets, but there are also fundamental differences because water markets are dealing 
with common property resource issues. In addition there is an issue as to whether recent events in 
financial markets during the global financial crisis make such markets an appropriate benchmark for 
comparison of resource markets. The issue of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) and the global 
financial crisis (GFC) is discussed by Ball [15] and Brown [16] who suggests that the failure to predict 
the bursting of the real estate bubble-that lead to the GFC-is in fact consistent with the central idea in 
the EMH. This paper analyzes clustering in the water allocation market over the past decade. In doing 
so, we will be able to determine (a) the extent of price clustering in this market and (b) given the 
constraints that prevent traders having a precise valuation of water, whether clustering behavior is a 
response to uncertainty (either weather or policy changes) or a strategic behavior. 
The only other paper that has examined price clustering in water markets [17] found robust evidence 
of clustering in the water market in northern Victoria from 2002 to 2007. Its’ econometric modeling 
suggested uncertainty faced by irrigators is a major reason for clustering. This paper extends the work 
by Brooks, Harris and Joymungul [17] in four ways. First, a longer time span is used covering 10 trading 
seasons in the northern Victorian water market. Much of this data is not publicly available.  
Second, alternative price clustering definitions are employed to check the robustness of the findings. 
Third, a variety of other data are included to identify specific factors associated with irrigators’ risk 
awareness that in turn influence the extent of price clustering. In particular, we are interested in assessing 
how government water policy changes, rainfall and evaporation influence bid and offer behavior in the 
water market. Finally, the extent to which price clustering is a result of traders’ response to uncertainty 
and/or strategic behavior is examined. 
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2. Study Area 
The Goulburn Murray Irrigation District (GMID) is Australia’s largest irrigation district, located in 
northern Victoria, along the River Murray. It has one of Australia’s longest running water markets with 
the bulk of trading taking place in three trading zones. The most active trading zone is Greater Goulburn, 
which provides the data source for this paper. Water allocations and entitlements have been traded since 
the early 1990s and irrigators are increasingly adopting water trading (in particular water allocation 
trading) over time [18]. Given that the majority of trades, especially bids and offers for water, are in the 
water allocations market, this is the market we chose to focus on for a study on price clustering in water 
markets. Dairy, fruit and, grape producers are the most significant buyers in the allocation market, 
whereas cereal, grazing and mixed farmers are the main sellers [19]. Over the past decade, MDB 
irrigators have faced considerable changes to their water allocation levels (which conversely influence 
the amount of land irrigated). An allocation level refers to the percentage of water entitlements that is 
available for the entitlement holder to use throughout a season. The resource manager manages seasonal 
allocation levels on behalf of all entitlement holders and regularly reviews the water budget calculations 
in the GMID. For example, Goulburn water allocation levels dropped from a consistently secure 200% 
in the early 1990s to around 30% in the mid 2000s. As a result, uncertainty for irrigators has increased 
considerably with opening allocations of 0% in eight consecutive years from 2002 and below 100% 
since 1998 and with closing allocations below 100% for five out of eight years from 2002 to 2010 [18]. 
In 2010 and 2011 higher than expected rainfall increased water allocations, this in turn increased the 
amount of land irrigated. Furthermore, water policy changes add to the climate uncertainties experienced 
by irrigators. There have been many government and institutional changes that impact on water markets 
in Australia over the time-period studied. This paper considers three of the most major ones that 
occurred, namely: (a) the lifting of the Cap (in 1994 the Victorian Government restricted the volume of 
water access entitlements that could be traded out of each irrigation district in Northern Victoria to no 
more than 2% annually of the volume of entitlement held in the district at the start of the irrigation 
season. On 1 July 2006 this was increased to 4%); (b) introduction of unbundling (this occurred on 1 
July 2007 in northern Victoria and it is the legal separation of rights to land and rights to access water,  
have water delivered, use water on land or operate water infrastructure, all of which can be traded 
separately) and (c) the times when the Australian Government is conducting a tender in buying  
back water entitlements (the Federal government began a decade long policy of buying back water 
entitlements from willing sellers in February 2008 in order to return water from a consumptive to an 
environmental use—see [7,8] for more detail). 
3. Price Clustering Literature and Applications to Water Markets 
3.1. Price Clustering Theories 
Empirical studies in the finance literature find that the degree of clustering in any market is a function 
of market structure, uncertainty, resolution costs and human preferences [14]. Several hypotheses have 
been developed to better understand why clustering occurs. These include: the negotiation hypothesis; 
the price resolution hypothesis (uncertainty); the attraction hypothesis and strategic behavior. We discuss 
briefly each of these hypotheses and their relevance in the context of the Australian water market. 
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A market’s structure may bring about clustering and Harris [20] developed the negotiation hypothesis 
to explain these effects, arguing that regulatory restrictions can reduce negotiation costs for traders. 
These restrictions require quotes and transaction prices to be stated as some multiple of a minimum price 
variation, or trading tick. Negotiation costs fall because restrictions create a discrete price set around 
which traders bid and offer. In the absence of these restrictions, the number of possible offers and 
counter-offers widens so that negotiation time also increases, creating higher price risks for 
participants [21]. A discrete price set reduces the amount of information exchanged, leading price to 
converge more quickly than would otherwise occur. As a result, transactions costs are reduced. The bid 
prices in the Australian water market analyzed are not required to be some multiple of a trading tick 
greater than one cent. Therefore, the degree of clustering is expected to be small because irrigators bid 
on a continuous price set. 
The method of trading can also influence the degree of clustering observed. For example, the use of 
electronic trade compared with floor trade (in person) alters the costs associated with precise valuation 
and, therefore, clustering. Chung and Chiang [14] found extreme clustering occurred on floor-traded 
futures compared with those traded electronically. Floor trade made precise valuation more costly 
because it takes more time to call out information to the accuracy of several digits and there is a wider 
margin for error in doing so [21]. The mechanism for water trading in the GMID creates a pool price 
that tends to decrease the costs associated with precise valuation, so a finer grid of numbers may be 
expected. However, a uniform pool price each trading week may also decrease the benefits of a precise 
valuation and the weekly trading frequency may be too long for traders to place more precise bids. 
Nevertheless, Brooks, Harris and Joymungul [17] found evidence of clustering on bid prices in the 
GMID water market. 
The price resolution hypothesis contends that prices may be evenly clustered at particular points if 
valuation is indecisive [22]. Loomes [23] and Butler and Loomes [24] argued that economic decision 
makers do not measure utilities exactly but act in a sphere of haziness, which represents the degree  
of difficulty in precise valuation. In other words, the risk of taking certain actions increases with 
uncertainty. A greater sphere of haziness implies a higher clustering propensity due to people’s risk 
aversion behavior. When uncertainty and volatility are high, precision valuation is costly, leading to 
greater clustering [25]. 
In the case of the water market, water availability uncertainty can be brought about by several  
factors, including rainfall variation, water allocations, demand fluctuations, government policy changes,  
and climate change [7,19,26]. Variable and unpredictable rainfall in the MDB system can be on a range 
of time scales and intra-season variations, making it difficult to forecast final closing allocations. 
Allocations are announced fortnightly during the water season, and as discussed often have started at 
0%. Uncertainty in allocations can lead to miscalculations regarding seasonal allocations by irrigators at 
the time of planting decisions. If an irrigator overestimates what their expected allocations will be at the 
time of planting a crop, they may have to buy additional water later. Alternatively, if an irrigator 
underestimates the final allocations they will receive, they may have surplus temporary water available 
that can be sold in the market at a later point in the season or be carried forward into the next season 
(depending on storage availability). Climate information only becomes available as the season 
progresses, so depending on how accurate irrigators were in their water expectations and the watering 
requirements of their permanent or annual crops, changes (or lack of changes) in monthly seasonal 
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allocations may cause relatively high price volatility in the market. Government intervention in water 
markets has increased considerably over the first decade of the 21st century [27]. Government intervention 
affects short- and medium-term price expectations, thereby increasing costs of precise valuations. 
Ikenberry and Weston [28] demonstrate that clustering of U.S. stock price also stems from the 
psychological preferences of market participants. This is broadly referred to as the attraction hypothesis 
and it suggests that clustering is the result of behavioral idiosyncrasies (heuristics). Tversky and 
Kahneman [29] argued that individuals often rely on a number of heuristic principles that reduce 
complex tasks, such as valuation to simpler or even non-optimal judgment operations. 
Brooks, Harris and Joymungul [17] use variables representing the price resolution hypothesis to 
explain price clustering in the GMID water market. Their results indicate a large proportion of the 
variation in price clustering cannot be explained by the price resolution hypothesis (the largest adjusted 
R2 in their regression models is 0.61). Therefore, the attraction hypothesis is very likely to be able to 
explain some of the variation in price clustering that cannot be explained by the models of Brooks,  
Harris and Joymungul [17]. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to collect data on testable variables 
representing the attraction hypothesis. 
An alternative explanation for clustering is that its existence is the result of strategic behavior—where 
people estimate the net benefits of their action [30]. Specifically, they weigh the benefits of increasing 
the precision of their bid/offer relative to the loss of value resulting from an imprecise estimate.  
In Victoria, the benefits of precise valuation are not obvious for individual traders on the water market 
because the water exchange Watermove used a pool price. Watermove was a trading organization in the 
GMID that conducted water exchanges within MDB trading zones, it operated by telephone and online. 
It closed down in August 2012, but still remains a valuable source of historical data, especially bid and 
offer data, and is used in the analysis here. Table 1 presents an example of how the Watermove exchange 
worked. For example, in the week of 8 September 2011, there were 35 sale offers with the offering price 
ranging from $14 to $100 and a total volume for sale of 4724.8 ML; and 21 buy bids ranging from $10 
to $26.38 with a total volume for purchase of 5841 ML. A pool price of $21.15 (the average price of the 
last fulfilled sale offer, $20, and buy bid, $22.3—which is calculated after all bids and offers are received 
for the week) was found for the week in order to maximize the volume traded, namely 1441.5 ML.  
As a result, the last fulfilled buy bid had bought only 80.5 ML, instead of the full amount, 200 ML.  
This exchange mechanism results in the potential for price clustering to create a deadweight loss.  
The size of the deadweight loss depends on the pool price, the last fulfilled sale offer and buy bid prices 
and the amount of unsatisfied volume to sell or buy. It can be evident that the pool price could be quite 
different from their offer prices, which is likely to be caused by the weekly trading frequency. In this 
setting, the cost of rounding will be the lower likelihood of their orders being executed and the cost of 
not rounding will be the extra expenditure paid by buyers or the reduced revenue for sellers. A strategic 
bidder, therefore, would evaluate whether the cost of rounding outweighs the cost of not rounding in 
order to decide the bid price. 
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Total Volume in 
Exchange 
14.00 200 200 26.38 200 200 
15.00 103 303 25.50 200 400 
15.00 18.2 321.2 25.00 400 800 
15.00 60 381.2 25.00 11 811 
17.00 80 461.2 25.00 200 1011 
18.00 55 516.2 25.00 150 1161 
19.00 320 836.2 23.38 200 1361 
19.90 100 936.2 22.30 200 1561 
20.00 100 1036.2 22.00 20 1581 
20.00 150 1186.2 20.38 200 1781 
20.00 120 1306.2 20.00 100 1881 
20.00 59 1365.2 20.00 100 1981 
20.00 24.3 1389.5 19.85 1500 3481 
20.00 52 1441.5 18.00 500 3981 
28.00 50 1491.5 18.00 200 4181 
28.00 210 1701.5 15.88 200 4381 
29.00 92 1793.5 15.00 200 4581 
30.00 379 2172.5 15.00 10 4591 
30.00 150 2322.5 14.22 500 5091 
30.00 150 2472.5 12.88 500 5591 
30.00 60 2532.5 10.00 250 5841 
30.99 300 2832.5 
Date: 8 September 2011 
Pool price: $21.15/ML 
Total volume traded: 1441.5 ML (The shaded bids 
and offer orders were executed, with the buy order 
indicated by asterisk only fulfilled by 80.5 ML) 
30.99 140 2972.5 
35.00 500 3472.5 
42.38 490.7 3963.2 
42.38 192.6 4155.8 
45.00 68 4223.8 
45.00 20 4243.8 
45.00 100 4343.8 
50.00 20 4363.8 
50.00 70 4433.8 
58.00 100 4533.8 
60.00 50 4583.8 
60.25 46 4629.8 
100.00 95 4724.8 
Traders who expect natural clustering can easily change their offer prices by a cent (penny) to avoid 
cluster points thereby increasing the probability of their offers being executed, described as the 
“pennying behavior” by Jennings [31] and also documented in Edwards and Harris [32]. This behavior 
is evident in the water market as demonstrated in Section 4.2. First, price clustering would decrease 
when traders seek a higher probability of their orders being executed. On the buyers’ side, traders would 
require a higher probability of their orders being filled if they had overestimated seasonal allocations 
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and therefore have experienced a deficit in available water. Assuming crop loss is a distinct possibility 
in this case; traders would avoid clustering to increase the likelihood that they will obtain water. On the 
sellers’ side, greater precision could be used if surplus water could be sold at a premium price;  
for example, during times of protracted drought. The high returns available during these periods would 
encourage a greater determination for offers to be executed. Second, when buyers (sellers) consider the 
extra dollar expenditure (revenue) as more significant, that is, the costs of not rounding as considerable, 
price clustering is expected to increase. It is difficult to identify which of these effects will dominate 
strategic behavior in the water market, as this will depend on the market and biophysical conditions at 
specific times. The analysis here will investigate the effects of those conditions on the potential for 
strategic clustering. 
3.2. Overall Water Market Clustering Hypothesis 
In summary, we propose the reasons for price-clustering behavior in the water allocation market as: 
(1) attraction; (2) price resolution (or uncertainty); and (3) strategic behavior. Attraction suggests traders 
prefer certain price points to others for psychological reasons, which is discussed in Section 3.1.  
Price resolution proposes that traders are more likely to cluster when they perceive uncertainty in water 
markets is higher. We expect the following variables will be important influences on uncertainty:  
trading volume, water allocation price, water entitlement price, bid-ask spreads, water allocation level,  
climate conditions, seasonal factors, and government policy changes. Strategic behavior explanations 
for price clustering (where water traders will evaluate the cost and benefits of clustering, or the costs of 
rounding and not rounding) would also be influenced by many of these same factors. Farmers decide to 
trade one more unit of water allocations if the cost (revenue) from the trade is smaller (greater) than the 
value of the marginal product of their additional water using activities. Hence, the bid and offer prices 
are likely to reflect the farming enterprises and the associated risk levels for the farming enterprises if 
there is water scarcity. Since price clustering is measured for the whole Greater Goulburn region,  
we cannot consider farming enterprise variables. This question is left for future research that needs 
access to data across a variety of regions or access to bid and offer individual survey records (either 
entitlement or allocation records). 
The following sections identify evidence that support the attraction hypothesis, as well as  
determining the extent to which price resolution and strategic behavior can explain price clustering in 
the water market. 
4. Price Clustering Evidence in the Greater Goulburn Water Allocation Market 
Before analyzing the drivers of clustering behavior in the water market, we first determined if there 
was evidence of clustering. We collected weekly data from Watermove on all individual buy and sell 
bids, including the volumes and prices of each bid for the period August 2001 to May 2011 for Greater 
Goulburn in Victoria—the most active trading zone. Most of these time series data are not publicly 
available. The data include quite a few weeks where the total number of orders is less than 20. In order 
to have a sufficiently large base of bids, we calculated price clustering at monthly intervals. Orders are 
fewer both at the start and toward the end of each season. The analysis covers ten years, and our monthly 
clustering series includes 100 observations, sufficient for the subsequent regression analyses. June and 
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July are not included as there is usually no, or very scarce, trading in those two months. For the whole 
dollar amount clustering series of sell offers within the 10% range of the pool price, the number of sell 
offers is smaller than 30 for most of the months in the 2010/2011 season. This small number of 
observations makes the clustering calculation unreliable. Therefore, there are 90 months instead of 100 
for this clustering series. 
4.1. Evidence of Price Clustering 
Table 2 provides an overview of the existence of price clustering in the Greater Goulburn water 
allocation market. We first examined the extent of clustering at whole dollar amounts, versus amounts 
at particular cents. Over the time period being considered, 80% of all water allocation buy bids and 96% 
of all sell bids were placed at whole dollar amounts. Moreover, Table 2 also illustrates that if percentages 
are weighted by the volume associated with each order, whole dollar clustering decreases to 73% and 
92% for the buy and sell orders respectively. 
Table 2. Water allocation price clustering (%) at whole dollars. 
Water Trade 
Type 
All Within 10% of Pool Price Within 5% of Pool Price 
Number ML Number ML Number ML 
Buy bids 79.59 72.74 78.39 70.77 78.43 71.11 
Sell offers 96.47 91.69 95.92 91.08 95.84 91.20 
By including orders where prices are too distant from the pool price the extent of price clustering may 
be biased upward because it is less costly to be precise if a price offering is likely to be far away from 
the pool price. As a result, it is possible for an irrigator to be acting in a greater sphere of haziness. 
Therefore, we calculate the clustering at whole dollar amounts again but use only those orders whose 
prices are within 10% of the pool price range and then only within 5% of the pool price range.  
As expected, Table 2 indicates the extent of price clustering decreases when orders are constrained in a 
narrower range around the pool price. However, the decrease appears to be small and insignificant. 
Table 3 explores the extent of clustering at specific whole dollar digits of the buy and sell offers.  
For buy offers that are whole dollar amounts, Table 3 shows more than half of them ended in zero, while 
about a fifth end in five. Results are similar if the percentages are weighted by the order volumes or if 
only those orders within 10% or 5% of the pool price range are used. 
The extent of clustering at whole dollar amounts and at specific whole dollar digits is similar to what 
is found for the Greater Goulburn trading zone in Brooks, Harris and Joymungul [17], where the authors 
use data from 2002 to 2007. Similar to Brooks, Harris and Joymungul [16], we used Chi-squared and 
HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) to test the significance of price clustering in our data. The results, 
which are available upon request, indicate the presence of significant price clustering. To further 
investigate price clustering over time, we present the buy and sell offer series for clustering at whole 
dollar amounts in Figure 1 and for clustering at the specific whole dollar digit zero in Figure 2. Figure 1 
demonstrates that neither series exhibits a clear time trend but the buy offer series appears to have a 
greater variation over time. An augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test indicates the absence of a unit 
root for both series. In Figure 2, both series appear to vary within a wider range, especially for the sell 
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offers, compared to the results in Figure 1. The time series of clustering at the specific whole dollar digit 
zero also exhibits no clear time trend and does not have a unit root. 
Table 3. Water allocation price clustering at whole dollar digits (%). 
Whole 
Dollar Digits 
All Within 10% of Pool Price Within 5% of Pool Price 
Number ML Number ML Number ML 
Buy offers 
0 54.17 44.82 52.14 44.53 51.61 42.99 
1 9.87 11.21 10.63 11.86 11.24 11.66 
2 4.58 8.64 5.32 5.39 5.83 6.60 
3 1.89 2.42 2.16 2.57 2.09 2.59 
4 0.76 0.88 0.94 1.20 0.83 1.19 
5 20.01 20.64 18.94 20.65 17.97 20.61 
6 3.99 5.08 4.27 5.61 4.22 4.88 
7 2.13 2.78 2.06 2.88 2.11 3.24 
8 1.74 2.62 2.39 3.97 2.92 4.94 
9 0.87 0.91 1.14 1.34 1.18 1.29 
Sell offers 
0 71.38 59.16 67.28 56.02 67.02 55.00 
1 0.48 0.84 0.53 0.86 0.49 0.74 
2 0.87 1.81 0.96 1.78 1.01 1.80 
3 0.66 1.32 0.87 1.36 1.05 1.78 
4 1.36 2.63 1.75 2.66 1.60 2.48 
5 14.52  19.76 16.54 21.00 15.86 20.31 
6 0.57 1.07 0.76 1.29 0.84 1.30 
7 1.04 1.67 1.16 1.68 1.27 1.77 
8 3.12 4.77 3.54 4.91 4.36 6.36 
9 6.01 6.96 6.62 8.44 6.50 8.46 
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Figure 2. Water allocation price clustering at whole dollar digit ending in zero (all offers). 
 
4.2. Evidence of Strategic Price Clustering Behavior 
Niederhoffer [33] argues that asymmetry between ask and bid quotes around integer prices could exist 
because of strategic behavior where the intention is to exploit opportunities resulting from price 
clustering. Aşçıoğlu, Comerton-Forde and McInish [34] show that investors submit orders with one tick 
better than zero and five to avoid queuing orders at prices ending in these digits. Given prices cluster on 
round numbers, a water trader who places a bid and wants a higher probability of execution than a bid 
at the clustered price will tend to place the bid one cent away from the clustered price. Figures 3 and 4 
investigate the evidence of strategic price-clustering behavior. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of sell offers not ending in whole or half dollar amounts. 
 
The figures respectively show the distribution of buy and sell offers that are not ended in whole or 
half dollar amounts. Clustering at half dollar amounts is also evident and much greater than its expected 
clustering. It is evident that the non-whole and half-dollar buy bids are most likely to be slightly greater 
than the price cluster, while the non-whole and half-dollar sell offers are mostly present slightly less than 
the price cluster. For those offers of whole-dollar, ending in other than zero or five, Figures 5 and 6 
display the distribution across the remaining eight digits. If expecting clustering happens at zero, a buyer 
is most likely to place a bid with just one extra dollar. In fact, the probability of a buy bid ended in one 
is about 0.38˗well above the probability of any other seven digits. On the sell side, a seller expecting 
clustering at zero is most likely to place a bid ended in nine. The probability of a sell bid ended in nine 
is about 0.43, well above the probability of any other seven digits. 
Figure 5. Distribution of buy offers across eight digits. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of sell offers across eight digits. 
 
5. Methodology 
Having observed substantial price clustering in the water allocation market, especially on the sell 
side, we now investigate the extent to which price clustering is driven by uncertainty and/or strategic 
behavior and if buyers and sellers’ price-clustering behavior are influenced in the same way.  
The dependent variable, observed price clustering in a month, is defined as a proportion, which is 
bounded between 0 and 1. A linear probability model may not be appropriate as it can generate 
predictions outside the 0 and 1 interval. One way to take account of the bounded nature is the logit 
transformation and thus the fractional logit model, first used by Papke and Wooldridge [35].  
The regression equation used was: 
ݕ௧∗=log( ௬೟ଵି௬೟)= Xt·β + μt (1)
where yt is the observed price clustering in month t, Xt is a vector of regressors that potentially influence 
the dependent variable, and μt is the disturbance. The logit transformation of yt	results in a latent variable 
ݕ௧*, as a linear function of a set of regressors, Xt. The fractional logit model was executed by Stata 13’s 
generalized linear model (GLM) command with the logit link function. We also used the type of  
standard error option that is heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent to account for any 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the disturbance term μt. 
yt adopts two types of clustering weighted by order volume, namely: (1) clustering at whole dollar 
amounts versus fractions; and (2) clustering at whole dollar amounts ending in zero versus the remaining 
nine digits. For the first definition, the calculation is based on all offers and offers within the 10% range 
of the pool price. The clustering calculation based on offers within the 5% range of the pool price is not 
modeled as there is no significant difference in clustering between the 5% and 10% pool price range. 
For the second definition, the calculation is based on all offers since offers within the 10% range of the 
pool price in some months do not have enough observations to calculate a reliable clustering percentage. 
  




Table 4 lists the detailed definitions of the independent and dependent variables that were used in the 
price clustering models. 
Table 4. Variable definitions. 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
WholeBuy Percentages of buy offers that are whole dollars in each month 
WholeBuy_10 
Percentage of buy offers that are whole dollars out of those within the plus and minus 10% range of 
pool price in each month 
WholeSell Percentages of sell offers that are whole dollars in each month 
WholeSell_10 
Percentage of sell offers that are whole dollars out of those within the plus and minus 10% range of 
pool price in each month 
ZeroBuy Percentage of buy offers that end in zero out of buy offers in whole dollars in each month 
ZeroSell Percentage of sell offers that end in zero out of sell offers in whole dollars in each month 
Watervolume Natural logarithm of volume traded for water allocations in Greater Goulburn in each month 
Waterallocprice Natural logarithm of average monthly price ($/ML) for water allocations in Greater Goulburn 
Waterentprice Natural logarithm of average monthly price ($/ML) for water entitlements in Greater Goulburn 
Ln_spread 
Natural logarithm of the spread between the last outstanding buyer and seller offering water allocation 
prices 
Allocationlevel Allocation level for Goulburn at the beginning of each month (%) 
Evapminusrainfall Monthly evaporation minus rainfall at Kerang station (mm) 
Feedbarley Natural logarithm of export price for feed barley ($/ton) 
Wholemilkprice Natural logarithm of export price for whole milk powder ($/kg) 
Cattleprice Natural logarithm of export price for cattle ($cent/kg) 
Carryover % 
Percentage of water entitlement allowed for carryover (note for 2010/11 season all the allocation in 
linked Allocation Bank Account on 30 June 2011 is eligible for carryover—there is no maximum) 
Govpolicy 
1 for the months when major water market policies were introduced/ongoing in the GMID (namely 
the lifting of the Cap, introduction of unbundling and the times when the Government is conducting 
a tender in buying back water). For Cap and unbundling introduction, the dummy is coded for the 
first three months after policy introduction 
Govpolicy10/11 Interaction variable between Govpolicy variable and season 2010/11 
Monthindex Monthly index from 1 to 10 for August to May, respectively 
Monthindexsqrd Monthly index squared  
Note: The first six variables are the respective dependent variables for the six regression models presented in 
Table 5. 
Our final choice of independent variables was influenced by other studies that have studied influences 
on water market trade (e.g., Wheeler et al. [19] and Brooks et al. [17]). It was also determined by 
statistical issues, such as serious multicollinearity (discussed in Section 6). There are a number of 
potential relationships our independent variables could have with price clustering, and these impacts will 
vary depending on whether we are looking at buyer or seller behavior. For example, weather, measured 
by net evaporation in millimeters, may be positively related to price clustering according to the price 
resolution (uncertainty) hypothesis. Net evaporation is calculated as total evaporation minus total rainfall 
for the month in question. Ceteris paribus, drier weather increases water prices and, in turn, increases 
the uncertainty perceived by irrigators who are trying to buy water, resulting in a higher level of  
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price-clustering behavior in the water market. However, drier weather presents a greater need for water 
in general. In turn, at the margin some buyers will have a greater need to have their orders executed, and 
therefore act more strategically in the market. This will reduce price clustering overall. Alternatively, as 
water prices increase sellers’ risk decreases so there is less need for strategic behavior to sell their water. 
As a result, the overall effect of weather on price clustering depends on whether water buyers or sellers 
are behaving more risk aversely or strategically. Other independent variables that may be influenced by 
the price resolution (uncertainty) hypothesis for both buyers and sellers include water allocation and 
water entitlement prices, trading volume, the spread between the offer prices, feed barley prices, 
carryover level and government policy. Our government policy variable represents either (a) a time of 
uncertainty, namely three months after major policy changes, such as unbundling of land and water and 
the changing water trade restriction policies; and/or (b) a time when the government is purchasing water 
entitlements in the market. Victoria has had annual restrictions on the amount of entitlement trade 
allowed out of a district for years. In January 2006, the cap on entitlement trade was eased from 2% to 
4%. The unbundling of land and water occurred in the GMID on 1 July 2007. Unbundling reduced the 
transaction costs associated with trading water, and allowed irrigators to own shares in different rivers 
(reducing risks). The unbundling aimed to facilitate trading in water entitlement and allocation and make 
trading more efficient. 
Variables that may be influenced primarily by the strategic behavior hypothesis include whole-milk 
powder prices, cattle prices and water allocations received by irrigators, but risk averse behavior may 
also play a part in influencing price clustering. Whole-milk powder represents a production output of 
dairy farmers, feed barley represents an input substitute for watering pasture for dairy production,  
and cattle represents an alternative output production substitute. The overall influence of each variable 
will be determined by the strength of each hypothesis in determining behavior. Wherever model statistics 
allow, we have included all the same independent variables in every model to examine whether there are 
any differences between the influences on buying and selling clustering behavior. 
6. Results and Discussion 
Results for our buy and sell price clustering models in the Greater Goulburn water allocation market 
are presented in Table 5. Since the coefficient results produced by the fractional logit model are not 
practically meaningful, we report the marginal effect estimates. Multicollinearity was an issue in some 
of the models, with the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of water allocation price, water entitlement 
price, spread, allocation level and government policy variables being greater than five. The potential 
consequence is to make the variables involved insignificant where they should be significant. In order 
to verify whether collinearity caused this problem, we dropped the variables with insignificant 
coefficients one by one and checked whether the coefficients of the remaining variables became 
significant. If this was the case, the involved insignificant variables were dropped. However, if it was 
not the case they were kept in order to minimize omitted variable bias. 
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Table 5. Buy and sell offer monthly water allocation price clustering. 
Variable WholeBuy WholeBuy_10 ZeroBuy WholeSell WholeSell_10 ZeroSell 
Watervolume −0.003 −0.034 −0.035 *** 0.016 *** 0.026 −0.032 * 
Waterallocprice 0.016 0.033 - −0.005 - 0.045 
Waterentprice 0.067 0.079 - −0.165 *** - - 
Ln_spread −0.015 −0.096 *** 0.050 *** 0.046 *** - 0.063 *** 
Allocationlevel 0.001 0.002 - −0.0002 - - 
Evapminusrainfall 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.0003 0.00004 −0.0001 0.00002 
Feedbarley 0.240 *** 0.377 *** 0.090 −0.010 0.052 −0.020 
Wholemilkprice −0.122 −0.225 * −0.130 ** 0.094 *** 0.026 0.179 ** 
Cattleprice −0.059 0.011 −0.039 −0.363 *** −0.478 *** −0.389 * 
Monthindex −0.055 ** −0.128 *** 0.016 *** 0.009 *** - 0.015 *** 
Monthindexsqrd 0.005 ** 0.011 *** - - - - 
Carryover −0.001 0.000 0.0002 −0.0003 −0.001 −0.001 ** 
Govpolicy 0.076 * 0.135 ** 0.008 −0.028 −0.070 ** −0.090 
Govpolicy10/11 −0.255 *** −0.248 *** −0.277 *** −0.029 - 0.075 
Observations 100 94 100 100 90 100 
Log likelihood −35.80 −32.66 −44.52 −19.34 −18.89 −42.65 
BIC −386.85 −356.94 −405.79 −393.45 −360.68 −401.31 
Note: Marginal effects are reported. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
6.1. Buy Offer Price Clustering 
Positive coefficients for net evaporation, feed barley price and the government policy dummy suggest 
that uncertainty (from the price resolution hypothesis) is able to explain clustering by buyers in the water 
market. Higher net evaporation loss increases water uncertainty and increases clustering. Higher feed 
barley prices augment water demand because it is an input substitute for on-farm feed production.  
In turn, as feed barley prices rise dairy farmers will find it more costly to replace water to grow their 
own pasture with purchased feed. This increases water market demand, and the costs of precise bids 
thereby causing greater clustering in buy offers. 
The government policy dummy represented periods of uncertainty and significant government 
intervention in the market (e.g., the first three months following significant government changes) and is 
associated with greater uncertainty in water prices; especially in the short-term after the policy 
introduction. For two of three buy models; periods of policy uncertainty were positively and significantly 
associated with price clustering. This implies that water allocation buyers are using price clustering as a 
response to policies that add to market uncertainty. In times of change; irrigators will be operating in a 
greater sphere of haziness; with higher levels of uncertainty and volatility being experienced; so buyers 
exhibit a higher clustering propensity. 
A surprising finding regarding the government policy variable is the result of its interaction with 
season 2010/11, when water was plentiful due to the record rainfall during the season, when prices 
dropped accordingly. Contrary to the positive impact of government policy on price clustering observed 
for previous seasons, government policy had a significantly negative impact in 2010/2011. Two 
influences (government intervention and rainfall) may explain this result. The Commonwealth was in 
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the market buying entitlement water from November 2010 to May 2011, which was a time of flooding 
and falling water prices. The flooding reduced irrigator buyers’ risk and their water demand, thereby 
reducing their clustering. 
The price resolution hypothesis also predicts that the trade volume is negatively associated with price 
clustering, while price is positively related to price clustering. Our results, however, only offer a very weak 
support for this. The volume of trade has a significantly negative impact on clustering in the zero buy 
model, while a negative but insignificant impact on clustering at whole dollar. Neither water allocation nor 
entitlement prices have significant impact on clustering although their impacts are estimated as positive. 
The coefficients of our time variable—months in the year (and its squared term)—suggests buyer price 
clustering generally decreases from the start of the season (August) until the month of January and then 
increases until the end of the season. Brennan [27] argued irrigators are generally risk averse and will hold 
more water than required at the start of a season when climate and allocation information is yet to be 
revealed, creating price premiums. As a result, some buyers may be more concerned with having their 
orders executed, increasing the costs of rounding. If, in the aggregate, all buyers behave this way, clustering 
will fall over the season. This result could also be explained by buyers’ aversion to the sequential resolution 
of uncertainty suggesting a preference for uncertainty to be resolved all at one time rather than sequentially 
[36]. Hence, facing limited and uncertain climate information at the beginning of the season, buyers intend 
to secure the water they need at one time rather than through multiple orders as the season progresses. 
Later in the season (e.g., January onwards in our results) when climate and allocation information are 
revealed, uncertainty will diminish, the costs of rounding will decrease and therefore, clustering will 
increase again. The results presented in Table 5 demonstrate this outcome for most of the buy models, 
whereas in the sell models the opposite is true: clustering tends to increase throughout the water season. 
The results that suggest strategic behavior as a reason for clustering by water buyers include the negative 
coefficient for whole milk powder price. When the milk powder price increases, irrigators have greater 
incentive to produce milk to take advantage of the higher returns. In turn, they are more determined to have 
their buy offers executed, so the costs of rounding increases thereby decreasing price clustering. We would 
expect to see the opposite effect on clustering if the price resolution hypothesis applied in this case. 
But overall, it appears that buyer bid behavior in water markets is most influenced by price resolution 
(uncertainty) rather than strategic behavior. In light of the fact that our data-set includes years during which 
irrigators were learning how to use the new water market, it is not surprising that, on balance, uncertainty 
would create costs associated with precision thereby leading to greater clustering. The continuing tendency 
for clustering on the buyers’ side of the market may well reflect the ongoing uncertainty caused by the 
combined effects of Australia’s highly variable climate and changes in government policy. 
6.2. Sell Offers Price Clustering 
Both the price resolution hypothesis and strategic behavior can also be identified from significant 
variables in our seller price clustering models. The results for volume could support either hypothesis with 
positive coefficients in the WholeSell models and negative coefficients for the ZeroSell model. An increase 
in clustering in the whole sell models reflects strategic behavior where the costs of rounding are low 
because sellers may be less determined to have their trades executed. The price resolution hypothesis better 
explains the decrease in clustering in the ZeroSell model because greater trade intensity creates higher 
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liquidity levels and produces more information with regard to value, allowing for greater precision. In 
combination, these factors reduce volatility and clustering. Alternatively, these mixed signs could suggest 
that the attraction hypothesis better explains the effects of volume on clustering for water sellers and that 
these traders are simply drawn to particular numbers. 
The positive significant coefficients for spread lend support to the price resolution hypothesis because 
a wider bid-ask spread indicates precise valuations are more difficult. This adds to market volatility,  
so clustering will increase. The negative and significant coefficient on cattle prices is also consistent with 
the price resolution hypothesis. An increase in cattle prices (which is a dryland output substitute for 
irrigated production) would lead to a reduction in water demand and price. Falling water prices increase 
the costs of rounding thereby causing the clustering levels to fall also. 
Water entitlement price is significantly negative in the WholeSell model, which suggests that strategic 
behavior, rather than the price resolution hypothesis, explains price clustering at whole dollars. When some 
buyers replace water entitlements with water allocations due to increasing water entitlement prices, the 
demand for water allocations increases and this pushes up water allocation prices. Water allocation sellers 
may consider the loss in revenue from pennying behavior is compensated by the higher allocation price 
and a greater chance of offer execution. Hence price clustering decreases and pennying behavior increases. 
A positive impact of whole milk powder price, or a negative impact of carry-over level on price 
clustering, would suggest that strategic behavior may be playing a role in seller behavior. Our results 
support these hypotheses. Whole milk powder price has a positive estimate in all sell models and 
significant in the WholeSell and ZeroSell models, while carry-over level has a negative estimate in all sell 
models but is only significant in the ZeroSell model. As whole milk powder price rises, demand for water 
also increases so that higher returns from selling water accrue and sellers may expect to trade a higher 
volume. This magnifies the extra dollar per megaliter from clustering at whole dollars ending in zero, 
indicating strategic behavior may be utilized by sellers in these situations. 
A higher carry-over percentage potentially increases the demand for water allocations in the market, 
especially later in the season, as risk-averse farmers can carry-over water that they have not used,  
and buy extra supplies to cover potential shortfalls the following season. This is a more dynamic 
explanation of the impact of carry-over in the water market, where irrigators are adjusting their practices 
over seasons. Water allocation prices are therefore higher than otherwise and price clustering decreases. 
The government policy variable had a significant negative impact on price clustering in the 
WholeSell_10 model. In general, periods of policy uncertainty decrease price-clustering behavior by 
sellers, indicating that perhaps price increases are expected, there is a lower risk of entering the market for 
sellers and hence price-clustering behavior falls. 
The relationship between most of the variables and clustering outcomes on the sellers’ side of the market 
runs in the opposite direction to that which would be expected under the price resolution hypothesis. 
Therefore, it appears that strategic behavior influences seller bid behavior more than buyer bid behavior. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has provided evidence to show there are a range of influences impacting buyer and  
sellers’ water allocation market behavior in the Greater Goulburn trading zone in Victoria. While there 
are similarities between irrigators’ behavior in the water market and general investors’ behavior  
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in the financial product markets, such as strong evidence of price clustering present in both markets, 
differences between two markets exist in terms of the explanations for price clustering, which we have 
investigated in the current study. Understanding irrigators’ water market clustering behavior allows us 
to gain a range of possible insights about how buyers and sellers may respond to uncertainty and policy 
changes in the market. These insights are useful for achieving more efficient resource allocation.  
Our analyses indicate that buyer-clustering behavior is for the most part explained by the price resolution 
hypothesis—where uncertainty tends to increase risks and decrease the costs of rounding. The cost of 
precision valuation increases when water allocation prices are difficult to predict and are volatile.  
For buyers, times of severe climate conditions (e.g., hotter and drier conditions), commodity price 
volatility, and government policy introduction increases the risk associated with trading and, thereby, 
their price-clustering behavior. 
Conversely, the models’ results seem to reflect that sellers’ clustering behavior is more reflective of 
strategic behavior than uncertainty. Strategic behavior in water markets prevails when the benefit of 
clustering does not outweigh its cost. These costs may include a reduction in the chance of order 
execution; an increase in the purchase cost for buyers; or an associated loss of sale revenue for water 
sellers. Correspondingly, the cost of unsuccessful sale offers is high if buyers are in greater need of water 
or if sellers keenly anticipate the revenue from water sales. Under such circumstances of high costs, 
traders are likely to consider carefully the cost of clustering and bid/offer strategically, which our results 
suggested happened the most in the seller clustering models. Hence, our results suggest sellers are acting 
in a more sophisticated manner in water markets than water buyers, and most of the costs of clustering 
are therefore borne by buyers. 
In terms of policy implications from this research, it is clear that there is a need, wherever possible, 
for governments to attempt to reduce irrigator uncertainty. This will be of most importance for buyers. 
More effective farmer adaptation to external impacts, such as water variability is driven by timely and 
useful information. Water price, climate, commodity forecasts, allocation information and certainty in 
government policy are all important influences of water market strategies. Incomplete and fragmented 
information, as well as uncertain policy, decreases farmers’ ability to manage their water needs. 
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